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ABSTRACT
Visual-based recommender systems (VRSs) enhance recommen-
dation performance by integrating users’ feedback with the vi-
sual features of product images extracted from a deep neural net-
work (DNN). Recently, human-imperceptible images perturbations,
defined adversarial attacks, have been demonstrated to alter the
VRSs recommendation performance, e.g., pushing/nuking category
of products. However, since adversarial training techniques have
proven to successfully robustify DNNs in preserving classification
accuracy, to the best of our knowledge, two important questions
have not been investigated yet: 1) How well can these defensive
mechanisms protect the VRSs performance? 2)What are the reasons
behind ineffective/effective defenses? To answer these questions,
we define a set of defense and attack settings, as well as recom-
mender models, to empirically investigate the efficacy of defensive
mechanisms. The results indicate alarming risks in protecting a
VRS through the DNN robustification. Our experiments shed light
on the importance of visual features in very effective attack sce-
narios. Given the financial impact of VRSs on many companies,
we believe this work might rise the need to investigate how to
successfully protect visual-based recommenders. Source code and
data are available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/868f87ca-
c8a4-41ba-9af9-20c41de33029/.
1 INTRODUCTION
Recommender Systems (RSs) have terrifically taken over online
shopping by providing personalized recommendations to users in
the flood of products of e-commerce platforms. Catching a large
number of historical interactions, RSs learn what each user might
like, and show short ranked lists of the presumably desired prod-
ucts. In domains such as fashion, food, and point-of-interest rec-
ommendations, images are associated with items to get customers’
attention. Visual-based Recommender Systems (VRSs) are the cor-
nerstone of recommender models to learn users’ preferences bymix-
ing past interactions with high-level visual features extracted from
those item photos. The intuition behind this class of recommenders
is that users’ preference is influenced by the observable style of
product images. Thanks to the power of Deep Neural Networks
(DNNs) in capturing high-level visual aspects, the state-of-the-art
of VRSs incorporates deep visual features extracted from Convo-
lutional Neural Networks (CNNs). For instance, He et al. [17, 18]
proposed one of the first models, named VBPR, to integrate vi-
sual features getting outperforming recommendation performance
compared to the basic version of the recommender (BPR-MF [32]).
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While different variants of VRSs have been proposed in the last
years —taking the quality of DNNs-extracted features for granted
— the work by Szegedy et al. [35] raised security concerns as they
showed that a malicious person, an adversary, may lead the net-
work to misclassify an image corrupted by a human-imperceptible
adversarial perturbation. Starting from Szegedy’s publication, dif-
ferent adversarial strategies (e.g., FGSM [13], PGD [25], and Carlini
& Wagner [7]) have demonstrated stronger and stronger attack
power. In parallel, a complementary branch of research has been
devoted to building robust DNNs (e.g., Adversarial Training [13],
Free Adversarial Training [34]). Consequently, the term Adversar-
ial Machine Learning (AML) currently denotes the study of such
attacks and defenses.
Motivated by the attacks abilities and the partial protection of the
state-of-the-art defense strategies, we identify VRSs as the category
of RSs most at risk. Indeed, while AML techniques have been widely
investigated in various domains (e.g., object detection [30], mal-
ware detection [40], speech recognition [20], graph [11]), studies
in recommendation scenarios have been conducted only recently.
For instance, He et al. [19] demonstrated the weakness of matrix
factorization recommenders with respect to adversarial perturba-
tions on model embeddings and proposed an adversarial training
procedure to make the system robust. Similarly, Tang et al. [36]
verified the efficacy of adversarial training in protecting VBPR (i.e.,
a VRS) from perturbations on image features. Moreover, Di Noia
et al. [10] proved that targeted adversarial attacks, i.e., FGSM and
PGD, applied directly to input images (and not their features) can
disturb the recommendation performance.
Differently from the previous works, in this work we propose
an empirical framework, Visual Adversarial Recommendation (VAR),
to investigate whether state-of-the-art defense strategies applied
to robustify the Image Feature Extractor (IFE) component of a VRS
are capable to mitigate the effect of up-to-date adversarial attack
strategies, i.e., FGSM, PGD, and even Carlini & Wagner [1, 6]. The
motivational scenario involves a competitor willing to increase the
recommendability of a category of products on an e-commerce
platform (e.g., sandals) by simply uploading adversarially perturbed
product images that are misclassified by the IFE as a much more
popular class (e.g., running shoes).
The main contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
• Study the efficacy of IFE defense approaches in protecting
the recommender through the analysis of 54 combinations
of defenses, attacks, and recommendation approached on
three real-world datasets.
• Joint evaluation of the alteration of visual recommendation
and features extraction performance, with a particular focus
on the variation of feature loss on perturbed images.
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• Propose a novel rank-based evaluation metric, named Cat-
egory normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain, to deeply
explore the efficacy of defenses (or the effects of attacks).
• Analyze the variation of global and beyond-accuracy recom-
mendation performance with (and without) defenses applied
under the most powerful attack scenarios.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we review related
work in Section 2. Then, we present the experimental framework
in Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5 we introduce the experimental
setups and present and discuss the empirical results. Finally, we
draw conclusion and raise open directions in Section 6.
2 RELATEDWORK
Adversarial Machine Learning.ML models have demonstrated
vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks [3, 35], i.e., specifically created
data samples able to mislead the model despite being highly similar
to their clean version. Particularly, great research effort has been
put into finding the minimum visual perturbation to attack images
to fool CNN classifiers. Szegedy et al. [35] formalized the adver-
sarial generation problem by solving a box-constrained L-BFGS.
Goodfellow et al. proposed Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [13],
a simple one-shot attack method that uses the sign of the gradient
of the loss function. Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [12] and Projected
Gradient Descent (PGD) [25] re-adapted FGSM to create stronger
attacks by iteratively updating the adversarial perturbation. Carlini
and Wagner [7] improved the problem definition presented in [35]
and built attacks powerful in deceiving several detection strate-
gies [6]. Along with the proposed attacks, many solutions have
also been provided regarding defense. Adversarial Training [13]
creates new adversarial samples at training time, making the model
more robust to such perturbed inputs. Defensive Distillation [29]
transfers knowledge between two networks to reduce the resilience
to adversarial samples, but was proven not to be as secure as ex-
pected against C & W attacks [5]. Free Adversarial Training [34]
truly eases the computational complexity of standard adversarial
training without giving up its effectiveness.
Security of Visual-based Recommender Systems. In this
work, the recommendation component is a visual-based recom-
mender model. Different works have demonstrated that the inte-
gration of image features in user’s preference predictor leads to
outperforming both recommendation [17, 18, 26] and search [22, 39]
tasks. The intuition is that the visual appearance of product im-
ages influences customer’s decisions (e.g., a customer who loves
red colors will likely buy red clothes) [14]. For instance, He et
al. [18] extended BPR-MF [32] by integrating high-level features
extracted from a pre-trained CNN, and Wang et al. [21] used im-
age features to predict complementary fashion articles. Chu et al.,
and Wang et al. [8, 38] demonstrated significantly improvements
in POI-recommendations when considering food images features.
Recently, Zhang and Caverlee [41] proposed a novel VRS showing
that dynamic visual features based on fashion blogger posts bring
improvements in fashion recommendations.
However, recommender models have been demonstrated to be
steadily under security risks. The security of RSs relates to the
study of different hand-engineered strategies to generate shilling
profiles which lead to the alteration of collaborative recommenda-
tions [24], and their defense mechanisms (e.g., detection [2] and
robustness [27]). On the other hand, the application of AML in
RSs [9] differs from previous works in the use of optimized pertur-
bations, and their respective defenses, that lead to drastic perfor-
mance reduction [19, 36, 37]. For example, He et al. [19] proposed
an adversarial training procedure to make the model robust to such
perturbations. Furthermore, Tang et al. [36] applied this defense to
make the proposed VRS (i.e., AMR) more robust to adversarial per-
turbations on image features. However, Di Noia et al. [10] noticed
the partial protection of VBPR and AMR against targeted adver-
sarial attacks on product images. Differently from these works, we
empirically verified DNN robustification strategies are not always
able to protect the recommender models against strong adversarial
attacks (e.g., C &W on all) when they are used to robustify the IFE.
3 THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
In this section, we describe the proposed Visual Adversarial Rec-
ommendation (VAR) experimental framework. First, we define some
preliminary concepts. Then, we provide an overview on all VAR com-
ponents. Finally, we present the evaluation measures to quantify
the effectiveness of the adversarial defenses under attacks.
3.1 Preliminaries
We introduce some notions and notation to formalize VAR.
Recommendation Task.We define the set of users, items and
0/1-valued preference feedback as U, I, and S, where |U|, |I |,
and |S| are the set sizes respectively. We reserve the use of 𝑢, 𝑖 ,
and 𝑠𝑢𝑖 , to indicate a user inU, an item in I and the feedback (e.g.,
a review) given by 𝑢 to 𝑖 saved in S. Furthermore, we define the
recommendation task as the action to suggest items that maximize,
for each user, a utility function. We indicate with 𝑠𝑢𝑖 the predicted
score learned from the RS upon historical preferences, represented
as a user-item preference-feedback matrix (UPM).
Deep Neural Network. Given a set of data samples (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 ),
where 𝑥𝑖 is the 𝑖-th image and 𝑦𝑖 is the one-hot encoded representa-
tion of 𝑥𝑖 ’s image category, we define 𝐹 as a DNN classifier function
trained on all (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 ). Then, we set 𝐹 (𝑥𝑖 ) = 𝑦𝑖 as the predicted prob-
ability vector of 𝑥𝑖 belonging to each of all the admissible classes,
and we calculate its predicted class as the index of𝑦𝑖 with maximum
probability value, and represent it as 𝐹𝑐 (𝑥𝑖 ). Moreover, assuming
an 𝐿-layers DNN classifier, we indicate with 𝐹 (𝑙) (𝑥𝑖 ) the output of
the 𝑙-th layer of 𝐹 given the input 𝑥𝑖 .
Adversarial Attack and Defense. We define an Adversarial
attack as the problem of finding the best value for a perturbation
𝛿𝑖 such that:
minimize d (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖 )
𝐹𝑐 (𝑥𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖 ) ≠ 𝐹𝑐 (𝑥𝑖 )
𝑥𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖 ∈ [0, 1]𝑛
(1)
where d (·) is a distance metric function (e.g., 𝐿0, 𝐿2 and 𝐿∞ norms).
The above definition states that (i) the attacked image 𝑥∗𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖
must be visually similar to 𝑥𝑖 , (ii) the predicted class for 𝑥∗𝑖 must
be different from the original one and (iii) 𝑥∗𝑖 must stay within its
original value range (i.e., [0, 1] for 8-bit RGB images re-scaled by
a factor 255). When 𝐹𝑐 (𝑥∗𝑖 ) is required to be generically different
from 𝐹𝑐 (𝑥𝑖 ), we say the attack is untargeted. On the contrary, when
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Figure 1: Overview of the VAR framework for the evaluation of adversarial attacks and defenses effects on a VRS. The adver-
sary can perturb a product image, the Image Feature Extractor (IFE) extract the image visual features, and the Visual-based
Recommender System (VRS) gets in input the user-item preference matrix (UPM) and the features to compute the top-𝐾 lists.
𝐹𝑐 (𝑥∗𝑖 ) is specifically required to be equal to a target class 𝑡 , we say
the attack is targeted. Finally, we define a Defense as the problem
to find ways of limiting the impact of adversarial attacks against a
DNN. For instance, a common solution consists of training a more
robust version of the original model function —we will refer to it
as 𝐹— which attempts to classify attacked images correctly.
3.2 Empirical Framework
After the definition of preliminaries, we discuss the VAR compo-
nents. Figure 1 shows an overview on the three main elements: the
adversary (i.e., a malicious user), the image feature extractor (IFE),
and the visual-based recommender system (VRS). First, we describe
the main characteristics of each mentioned component. Then, we
introduce a novel set of metrics to evaluate the recommendation
performance at varying of the adversary, the IFE, and the VRS.
Adversary. To align with the AML literature, we follow the
attack —and defense— adversary threat model outlined in Carlini
et al. [4]. The adversary’s goal is to attack the IFE so that images
of low-ranked categories of products are incorrectly classified as
the category of high-ranked ones. That is, the former will likely
be recommended more (on average) than before. To this malicious
purpose, the adversary is aware of all recommendation lists (used
to choose the source and target categories), and she has perfect
knowledge of the IFE, i.e., its architecture, its trainable weights,
and its output (white-box attack). Additionally, we suppose the
adversary can perform 𝐿∞ (i.e., FGSM and PGD), and 𝐿2 (i.e., Carlini
& Wagner) attacks (see section 4.2 for further details). Finally, in
our motivating scenario, the adversary can replace the original
images on the physical servers of the e-commerce platform with
the attacked one, which will be used by the VRS to produce the
recommendation lists.
Image Feature Extractor (IFE).The input sample 𝑥𝑖 represents
the photo associated with the 𝑖-th product in the set of items I,
which may appear in the top-𝐾 recommendation list shown to an e-
commerce platform customer. Hence, the IFE is a DNN pre-trained
classifier to extract high-level visual features from 𝑥𝑖 . The actual
extraction takes place at one of the last layers of the network, i.e.,
𝐹 (𝑒) (𝑥𝑖 ), where 𝑒 refers to the extraction layer. We define this layer
output 𝐹 (𝑒) (𝑥𝑖 ) = 𝜑𝑖 as a 𝛾-dimensional vector that will be the
input of the VRS. In the case of defense, the IFE model function is
replaced by 𝐹 since the defense strategy is applied to the pre-trained
traditional model previously indicated as 𝐹 . Note that the IFE is a
key component in VAR since it represents the connection between
the adversary —the author of the attack— and the VRS.
Visual-basedRecommender System (VRS). In the VAR frame-
work, the VRS is the component aimed at addressing the recom-
mendation task. The model accepts two inputs: (i) the historical
UPM, and (ii) the set of features of item images extracted from the
IFE component. Hence, it produces recommendation lists sorted by
the preference prediction score evaluated for each user-item pair
without previous interactions. Indeed, the VRS preference predictor
takes advantage of the pure collaborative filtering source of data
(i.e., the UPM) especially when integrated with the high-level mul-
timedia features since they unveil the visual aspects that arouse
customer’s preferences [18]. In the VAR motivating example, the
VRS is the final victim of the malicious user. For this reason, we
focus our analysis on its variation performance and propose novel
measures to investigate how much it is influenced by different
settings of both the adversary and the IFE.
3.3 Evaluation
To answer the research questions proposed in Section 1, we need
to perform three levels of investigation on (i) the effectiveness of
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adversarial attacks in misusing the classification performance of the
DNN used to implement the IFE, (ii) the variation of the accuracy—
and beyond-accuracy— recommendation performance, and (iii) the
evaluation of the consequences of attack and defense mechanisms
on the recommendability of the attacked category of products.
In AML, several publications focused on quantifying adversarial
attacks success in corrupting the classification performance of a
target classifier (i.e., the attack Success Rate (𝑆𝑅) [7]). Similarly,
there is a vast literature about accuracy and beyond accuracy of
RSs [33] recommendation metrics. On the other hand, we have
observed a lack of literature in evaluating adversarial attacks on
RSs content data. As a matter of facts, Tang et al. [36] evaluate the
effects of untargeted attacks on classical system accuracy metrics,
i.e., Hit Ratio (𝐻𝑅) and normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain
(𝑛𝐷𝐶𝐺), while Di Noia et al. [10] propose a modified version of
𝐻𝑅 to evaluate the fraction of adversarially perturbed items in the
top-𝐾 recommendations. To fill this evaluation metrics gap, we
redefined the Category Hit Ratio (𝐶𝐻𝑅@𝐾 ) [10] and formalized the
normalized Category Discounted Cumulative Gain (𝑛𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@𝐾 ).
Definition 1 (Category Hit Ratio). Let C be the set of the
classes extracted from the IFE, let I𝑐 = {𝑖 ∈ I, 𝑐 ∈ C|𝐹𝑐 (𝑥𝑖 ) = 𝑐} be
the set of items whose images are classified by the IFE in the 𝑐-class
(i.e., the category of low recommended items), we define categorical
hit (chit) as:
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡 (𝑢, 𝑘) =
{
1, if k-th item ∈ I𝑐
0, if k-th item ∉ I𝑐
(2)
where categorical hit (𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡 (𝑢, 𝑘)) is a 0/1-valued function that is 1
when the item in the 𝑘-th position of the top-𝐾 recommendation
list of the user 𝑢 is in the set of attacked items not-interacted by 𝑢.
Consequently, we define the 𝐶𝐻𝑅@𝐾 as follows:
𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑢@𝐾 =
1
𝐾
𝐾∑︁
𝑘=1
𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑡 (𝑢, 𝑘) (3)
Since Category Hit Ratio does not pay attention to the ranking
of recommended items, we propose a novel rank-wise positional
metric, named Category normalized Discounted Cumulative
Gain, that assigns a gain to each considered ranking position. By
considering a relevance threshold 𝜏 , we assume that each item
𝑖 ∈ I𝑐 has an ideal relevance value of:
𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑙 (𝑖) = 2(𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝜏+1) − 1 (4)
where 𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑥 is themaximum possible score for items. By considering
a recommendation list provided to user 𝑢, we define the relevance
(𝑟𝑒𝑙 (·)) of a suggested item 𝑖 as:
𝑟𝑒𝑙 (𝑘) =
{
2(𝑠𝑢𝑖−𝜏+1) − 1, if k-th item ∈ I𝑐
0, if k-th item ∉ I𝑐
(5)
where 𝑘 is the position of the item 𝑖 in the recommendation list.
In Information Retrieval, the Discounted Cumulative Gain (𝐷𝐶𝐺)
is a metric of ranking quality that measures the usefulness of a
document based on its relevance and its position in the result list.
Analogously, we define Category Discounted Cumulative Gain
(𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺) as:
𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑢@𝐾 =
𝐾∑︁
𝑘=1
𝑟𝑒𝑙 (𝑘)
log2 (1 + 𝑘)
(6)
Since recommendation results may vary in length depending on
the user, it is not possible to compare performance among different
users, so the cumulative gain at each position should be normalized
across users. In this respect, we define the Ideal Category Discounted
Cumulative Gain (𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@𝐾 ) as follows:
𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@𝐾 =
𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝐾, |I𝑐 |)∑︁
𝑘=1
𝑟𝑒𝑙 (𝑘)
log2 (1 + 𝑘)
(7)
In practical terms, 𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@𝑁 indicates the score obtained by an
ideal recommendation list that contains only relevant items.
Definition 2 (normalized Category Discounted Cumula-
tive Gain). Let C be the set of the classes extracted from the IFE,
let I𝑐 = {𝑖 ∈ I, 𝑐 ∈ C|𝐹𝑐 (𝑥𝑖 ) = 𝑐} be the set of items whose images
are classified by the IFE in the 𝑐-class (i.e., the category of low recom-
mended items). Let 𝑟𝑒𝑙 (𝑘) be a function computing the relevance of
the 𝑘-th item of the top-𝐾 recommendation list, and 𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@𝐾 be
the𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺 for an ideal recommendation list only composed of relevant
items. We define the normalized Category Discounted Cumulative
Gain (𝑛𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺), as:
𝑛𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺𝑢@𝐾 =
1
𝐼𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@𝐾
𝐾∑︁
𝑘=1
𝑟𝑒𝑙 (𝑘)
log2 (1 + 𝑘)
(8)
The 𝑛𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@𝐾 is ranged in a [0, 1] interval, where values close
to 1 mean that the attacked items are recommended in higher
positions (e.g., the attack is effective). In Information Retrieval, a
logarithm with base 2 is commonly adopted to ensure that all the
recommendation list positions are discounted.
4 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we first introduce the three real-world datasets,
the adversarial attack strategies, the defense methods to make the
IFE more robust, and the VRSs. Conclusively, we present the com-
plete set of evaluation measures and a detailed presentation of the
experimental choices to make the results reproducible.
4.1 Datasets
Amazon Men & Amazon Women [17] are two datasets about
men’s and women’s products belonging to Amazon category "Cloth-
ing, Shoes and Jewelry". They come with both users’ ratings and
item images. Since we consider an implicit feedback setting, we
transformed each user’s rating into an implicit 0/1-feedback.
Tradesy [18] dataset contains implicit feedback (i.e., purchase
histories, and desired products) extracted from the second-hand
selling social platform of the same name. We followed the same
pre-processing procedure seen for Amazon Men and Amazon Women.
Moreover, to reduce the degrading effects of cold-users and items
on recommendation performance, we applied different k-core set-
tings [17]. In particular, we chose different k values to explore
various density dataset characteristic settings. Table 1 shows the
dataset statistics as a result of the pre-processing steps described
above. The datasets are available on the code repository web page.
4.2 Adversarial Attacks and Defenses
In this section we present all the adversarial attack and defense
techniques adopted in the experimental phase.
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Table 1: Dataset statistics.
Dataset k-cores |U| |I| |S| density
Amazon Men 5 24, 379 7, 371 89, 020 0.000495
Amazon Women 10 16, 668 2, 981 54, 473 0.001096
Tradesy 10 6, 253 1, 670 21, 533 0.002062
4.2.1 Attacks. We explored three state-of-the-art adversarial at-
tacks against images.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [13] is an 𝐿∞-norm opti-
mized attack that produces an adversarial version of a given image
in just one evaluation step. A perturbation budget 𝜖 is set to modify
the strength —and consequently, the visual perceptibility— of the
attack, i.e., higher 𝜖 values mean stronger attacks but also more
evident visual artifacts.
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [25] is an 𝐿∞-norm op-
timized attack that takes a uniform random noise as the initial
perturbation, and iteratively applies an FGSM attack with a contin-
uously updated small perturbation 𝛼 —clipped within the 𝜖-ball—
until either it effectively reaches the network misclassification (i.e.,
𝐹𝑐 (𝑥𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖 ) = 𝑡 ) or it completes the number of possible iterations
(i.e., 10 iterations in our evaluation setting).
Carlini and Wagner attacks (C & W) [7] are three attack
strategies based on 𝐿0, 𝐿2 and 𝐿∞ norms that re-formulate the
traditional adversarial attack problem (see 1) by replacing the dis-
tance metric with a well-chosen objective function. This integrates
a parameter 𝜅, i.e., the confidence of the attacked image being clas-
sified as 𝑡 , and an additional parameter 𝑎, i.e., the trade-off between
optimizing the objective function and the classifier loss function.
4.2.2 Defenses. We explored two defense strategies.
Adversarial Training [13] consists of injecting adversarial sam-
ples into the training set to make the trained model robust to them.
The major limitations of this idea are that it increases the com-
putational time to complete the training phase, and it is deeply
dependent on the type of attack strategy used to craft adversar-
ial samples. For instance, Madry et al. [25] generates adversarial
images with the PGD-method to make the trained model robust
against both one-step and multi-steps attack strategies.
Free Adversarial Training [34] proposes a training procedure
3 − 30 times faster than the classical Adversarial Training [13, 25].
Differently from the previous one, this method updates both the
model parameters and the adversarial perturbations doing a unique
backward pass in which gradients are computed on the network
loss. Moreover, to simulate a multi-step attack —which would make
the trained network more robust— it keeps retraining on the same
minibatch for𝑚 times in a row.
4.3 Visual-based Recommender Models
To evaluate VAR approach, we have considered three VRSs.
Factorization Machine (FM) [31] is a recommender model
proposed by Rendle [31] to estimate the user-item preference score
with a factorization technique. For a fair comparison with VBPR and
AMR, we used BPR [32] loss function to optimize the personalized
ranking. In this respect, we adopted LightFM [23] implementation
integrating the UPM with the extracted continuous features. It is
worth noticing that, differently from the recommenders we are
going to present later, this model is not specifically designed for
visual-recommendation tasks.
Visual Bayesian Personalized Ranking (VBPR) [18] is a typ-
ical matrix factorization CF model to learn user-item latent rep-
resentation by optimizing a BPR rank-wise loss function. Given a
user 𝑢 and a not-interacted item 𝑖 , the preference prediction score
is 𝑠𝑢𝑖 = 𝑝𝑇𝑢𝑞𝑖 + 𝜃𝑇𝑢 (E𝜑𝑖 ) + 𝛽𝑢𝑖 , where 𝑝𝑢 ∈ P |U |×ℎ and 𝑞𝑖 ∈ Q |I |×ℎ
are latent vectors of user 𝑢 and item 𝑖 respectively, ℎ is the latent
space dimension (ℎ << |U|, |I |), and 𝜃𝑢 is a 𝜐-dimensional vector
to capture the visual interaction between 𝑢 and the projection of
𝜑𝑖 into a low-dimensional space through a (𝜐 × 𝛾)-kernel matrix
E. Furthermore, 𝛽𝑢𝑖 includes the sum of the overall offset, and the
user, item and global visual bias.
Adversarial Multimedia Recommendation (AMR) [36] is
an extension of VBPR that integrates the adversarial training pro-
cedure proposed by He et al. [19] named adversarial regularization
to build a model that is increasingly robust to FGSM-based pertur-
bations against image features. The score prediction function is the
same as VBPR since the differences are included in the training
procedure.
4.4 Evaluation Metrics
In addition to 𝐶𝐻𝑅@𝐾 and 𝑛𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@𝐾—proposed in Section 3— ,
we studied both the variation of overall recommendation perfor-
mance and the consequences of adversarial images on th IFE.
Adversarial attacks, and defenses, performance are evalu-
ated through the attack Success Rate (𝑆𝑅), and the Feature Loss (𝐹𝐿),
i.e., the mean squared error between the extracted image features
before and after the attack.
Recommendation performance is evaluated with 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙@𝐾 ,
that considers the fraction of recommended products in the top-𝐾
recommendation that hit test items, and 𝑛𝐷𝐶𝐺@𝐾 , that increas-
ingly discounts the hits by the log2 of the item positions in the list.
Moreover, we investigate three beyond-accuracy measures: the item
coverage (𝐼𝐶𝑜𝑣@𝐾), the Gini index (𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖@𝐾), and the expected
free discovery (𝐸𝐹𝐷@𝐾). Please note that 𝐶𝐻𝑅@𝐾 , 𝑛𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@𝐾 ,
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙@𝐾 , 𝑛𝐷𝐶𝐺@𝐾 , and 𝐸𝐹𝐷@𝐾 are computed on a per-user
basis, and then averaged across all users.
4.5 Reproducibility
To let other researchers to continue our study, and further integrate
the framework, in this section, we provide reproducibility details.
Adversarial attackswere implemented with the Python library
CleverHans [28]. For both FGSM and PGD, we adopted 𝜖 = {4, 8}
re-scaled by 255. Then, for PGD’s 𝛼 parameter, we set the multi-
step size as 𝜖/6 and the number of iterations to 10. As for the C
& W attack, we ran a 5-steps binary search to calculate 𝑎, starting
from an initial value of 10−2 and set 𝜅 to 0. Furthermore, we set the
maximum number of iteration to 1000 and adopted Adam optimizer
with a learning rate of 5×10−3 as suggested in C &W [7]. Note that,
to reproduce a real attack scenario, we saved the adversarial images
in tiff format (i.e., a lossless compression), as lossy compression
(e.g., JPEG) may affect the effectiveness of attacks [15].
Feature extraction and Defenses.We used ResNet50 [16] to
extract high-level image features. From the PyTorch implementa-
tion, we set AdaptiveAvgPool2d as extraction layer, whose output
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Table 2: Origin-target category classes selected for the VAR ex-
perimental evaluation.𝐶𝐻𝑅@50 is averaged across the 9 com-
binations of recommenders and defenses without attacks.
Dataset Origin 𝐶𝐻𝑅@50 Target 𝐶𝐻𝑅@50
Amazon Men Sandal 1.0310 Running Shoe 4.7852
Amazon Women Jersey, T-shirt 1.2573 Brassiere, Bandeau 4.2672
Tradesy Suit 0.8951 Trench Coat 3.6955
Table 3: Average values of Success Rate (𝑆𝑅) and Feature Loss
(𝐹𝐿) for each combination. 𝑆𝑅 values are multiplied by 10−3.
Dataset AdversarialAttack
Image Feature Extractor
Traditional Adv. Train. Free Adv. Train.
𝑆𝑅 𝐹𝐿 𝑆𝑅 𝐹𝐿 𝑆𝑅 𝐹𝐿
Amazon
Men
FGSM (𝜖 = 4) 65% 14.0948 18% 0.0330 15% 0.0278
FGSM (𝜖 = 8) 87% 36.3190 24% 0.2658 20% 0.2320
PGD (𝜖 = 4) 97% 36.8843 18% 0.0334 15% 0.0283
PGD (𝜖 = 8) 100% 134.9854 24% 0.2801 21% 0.2371
C & W 89% 20.5172 48% 2.8022 42% 1.9080
Amazon
Women
FGSM (𝜖 = 4) 18% 9.6677 0% 0.0113 0% 0.0094
FGSM (𝜖 = 8) 28% 22.0499 3% 0.0851 0% 0.0671
PGD (𝜖 = 4) 85% 27.6645 0% 0.0119 0% 0.0102
PGD (𝜖 = 8) 100% 130.3309 4% 0.0974 0% 0.0735
C & W 89% 21.2380 6% 0.1770 6% 0.3376
Tradesy
FGSM (𝜖 = 4) 83% 21.4011 43% 0.0308 30% 0.0274
FGSM (𝜖 = 8) 93% 46.2579 47% 0.2376 47% 0.2130
PGD (𝜖 = 4) 100% 53.4589 43% 0.0311 30% 0.0273
PGD (𝜖 = 8) 100% 175.7102 47% 0.2478 47% 0.2078
C & W 100% 25.9374 80% 2.1185 63% 1.9739
is a 2048-dimensional vector. In the non-defended scenario, we
adopted ResNet50 pre-trained on ImageNet with traditional train-
ing. Conversely, when applying defense techniques, we adopted
ResNet50 pre-trained on ImageNet with Adversarial Training and
Free Adversarial Training. For the former, we used a model trained
with 𝜖 = 4. For the latter, we used a model trained with 𝜖 = 4 and
𝑚 = 4. Both models are available in the published repository.
Recommenders.We realized the FM model using the LightFM
library [23]. We trained the model for 100 epochs and left all the
parameters with the default values in the library. Both VBPR and
AMR were implemented in TensorFlow. We trained the models
following the training settings adopted in Tang et al. [36]. We did
not apply the hyper-parameters search, and used the parameters
suggested in the referenced works, since the goal of our evaluation
is to investigate the protection abilities of defense mechanisms
against attacks by fixing a VRS.
Experimental Scenario.We trained each recommender on clean
images, we selected the origin-target categories such that target ones
was about four times more recommended of the origin one, and trained
a novel model using the perturbed images. Table 2 shows the selected
categories. For each dataset, we used the leave-one-out training-test
protocol putting in the test set the last time-aware user’s interaction.
5 DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS
In this section, we present and discuss the VAR experimental results.
As for the recommendation results, we evaluate the top-20, and
top-50 recommendation lists since they correspond to 26 and 48
fashion items shown on smartphones and desktop navigation on
Amazon.com, respectively. In the remainder of this section, we may
adopt the notation <dataset, VRS, attack, defense> to indicate a
specific VAR configuration, where each field in the quadruple may
vary depending on the datasets and methods described in Section 4.
Analysis of the effectiveness of defense mechanisms in pro-
tecting the model from adversarial attacks against IFEs. We
start from analyzing the experimental results shown in Table 3 (i.e.,
on attack’s 𝑆𝑅, 𝐹𝐿) and Table 4 (i.e., 𝐶𝐻𝑅@𝐾 , 𝑛𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@𝐾 ).
Analysis of Attack Success Rate.We start the VAR analysis by
exploring the success rate of experimented attacks in fooling the IFE
with or without the adversarial robustification techniques. Results
showed in Table 3 confirm PGD and C &W as the strongest attacks
when applied to lower the classification accuracy of a defense-free
CNN classifier. For instance, PGD (𝜖 = 8) reaches the 100% of 𝑆𝑅
for all the studied datasets, while C & W’s 𝑆𝑅 is always more than
89%. As expected, this behavior is different when VAR is tested
with defense strategies. Under this setting, C & W emerges as
the best offensive solution against defense strategies, as already
demonstrated in [7]. As an example, we observe an average 𝑆𝑅
reduction in the 𝑆𝑅 results of 75% for FGSM-methods and 79% for
PGD, while it decreases by 43% for C & W.
Hence, we compare the 𝑆𝑅 results to the variation of visual-
aware recommendations of the products belonging to the perturbed
category of images. Table 4 presents the results of the proposed
VAR rank-based evaluation with respect to the origin-target attack
scenarios defined in Table 2. Quite surprisingly, Table 4 shows PGD
attacks as extremely more incisive than C & W in the defense-free
settings, i.e., the average value of 𝐶𝐻𝑅@20 for PGD (𝜖 = 8) is
1.2612, while it is 0.5690 for C & W. Conversely, this difference is
less observable under defense-activated VAR settings, where all the
attacks share almost comparable results. These outcomes are in
contrast with the 𝑆𝑅, thus we raise the first contribution: attack
success rate is not directly related to the effects on the recommendation
performance. In other words, be powerful enough to lead a classifier
in mislabelling an origin product image towards a target class does
not explain the effects on the recommendation lists.
Analysis of Features Loss. Motivated by the previous obser-
vations, we investigate the Feature Loss (𝐹𝐿) between original and
attacked samples whose values are displayed in Table 3. Comparing
the results in Table 3 and Table 4 we discover a correlation between
the variation of 𝐹𝐿 and the attack efficacy on VRSs. For instance,
PGD and C &W results about𝐶𝐻𝑅@𝐾 , and 𝑛𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@𝐾 , are coher-
ent with the differences observed on the 𝐹𝐿, i.e., the average value
of 𝐹𝐿 for PGD (𝜖 = 8) is 0.1470 and it is 0.0225 for C & W. This
association is further confirmed by the less oscillating values of
𝐶𝐻𝑅@𝐾 and 𝑛𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@𝐾 under defense-activated VAR settings. For
instance, <Amazon Men, Traditional, VBPR> and <Amazon Men, (Ad-
versarial Training, Free Adversarial Training), VBPR> experiments
get a𝐶𝐻𝑅@20 standard deviation of 0.3950 and 0.0260 respectively,
i.e., a difference of more than one order of magnitude. This trend
holds true also for 𝐹𝐿 values, i.e., 0.0441 and 0.0011, respectively.
Then, we derive the following contribution: the modification of VRS
is closely linked to the magnitude difference between original and per-
turbed image features. In short, perturbations leading to larger feature
modifications may cause a strong influence on the recommendability
of the altered product categories.
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Table 4: Results of the VAR framework. Bold values are the highest values for each <dataset, VRS, defense> combination.
Dataset VRS AdversarialAttack
Image Feature Extractor
Traditional Adversarial Training Free Adversarial Training
𝐶𝐻𝑅@20 𝐶𝐻𝑅@50 𝑛𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@20 𝑛𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@50 𝐶𝐻𝑅@20 𝐶𝐻𝑅@50 𝑛𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@20 𝑛𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@50 𝐶𝐻𝑅@20 𝐶𝐻𝑅@50 𝑛𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@20 𝑛𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@50
Amazon
Men
FM
Original 0.4857 1.1959 0.0246 0.0245 0.4003 0.9793 0.0204 0.0201 0.3984 0.9791 0.0202 0.0201
FGSM (𝜖 = 4) 0.5193 1.2670 0.0266 0.0262 0.3811 0.9315 0.0198 0.0192 0.3750 0.9324 0.0194 0.0192
FGSM (𝜖 = 8) 0.5092 1.2693 0.0263 0.0261 0.3715 0.9299 0.0193 0.0191 0.3837 0.9281 0.0195 0.0189
PGD (𝜖 = 4) 0.5147 1.2692 0.0266 0.0263 0.3729 0.9187 0.0191 0.0188 0.3735 0.9112 0.0193 0.0188
PGD (𝜖 = 8) 0.5024 1.2672 0.0256 0.0256 0.3765 0.9215 0.0194 0.0190 0.3825 0.9367 0.0194 0.0191
C & W 0.5155 1.2573 0.0263 0.0261 0.3765 0.9338 0.0194 0.0191 0.3798 0.9428 0.0194 0.0192
VBPR
Original 0.6352 1.4931 0.0288 0.0291 0.3028 0.8130 0.0141 0.0155 0.3702 1.1547 0.0159 0.0207
FGSM (𝜖 = 4) 0.5665 1.2607 0.0299 0.0269 0.6029 1.4496 0.0316 0.0306 0.5688 1.4924 0.0283 0.0296
FGSM (𝜖 = 8) 0.6052 1.3498 0.0342 0.0300 0.5879 1.4333 0.0316 0.0302 0.5596 1.4433 0.0277 0.0290
PGD (𝜖 = 4) 1.0936 2.6175 0.0538 0.0539 0.6211 1.4763 0.0324 0.0309 0.5778 1.5003 0.0286 0.0301
PGD (𝜖 = 8) 1.5736 3.7285 0.0781 0.0780 0.6247 1.4565 0.0335 0.0312 0.6141 1.5768 0.0310 0.0320
C & W 0.5972 1.4003 0.0290 0.0285 0.6652 1.4487 0.0336 0.0305 0.6444 1.5641 0.0348 0.0334
AMR
Original 0.3876 0.8587 0.0196 0.0178 0.4924 1.1802 0.0228 0.0230 0.1070 0.6255 0.0038 0.0100
FGSM (𝜖 = 4) 0.3295 0.8282 0.0150 0.0159 0.4332 1.1736 0.0235 0.0242 0.4103 1.1595 0.0187 0.0217
FGSM (𝜖 = 8) 0.3053 0.8668 0.0135 0.0160 0.4318 1.1827 0.0238 0.0246 0.4007 1.1250 0.0188 0.0214
PGD (𝜖 = 4) 0.8064 1.9749 0.0418 0.0413 0.4435 1.1756 0.0242 0.0247 0.4173 1.1657 0.0193 0.0220
PGD (𝜖 = 8) 2.1264 5.2984 0.1179 0.1141 0.4323 1.1447 0.0237 0.0241 0.3942 1.1386 0.0181 0.0213
C & W 0.3610 0.8171 0.0170 0.0163 0.4293 1.1227 0.0230 0.0233 0.4378 1.1623 0.0202 0.0224
Amazon
Women
FM
Original 0.6771 1.6409 0.0335 0.0333 0.4622 1.1589 0.0236 0.0237 0.3186 0.7741 0.0158 0.0155
FGSM (𝜖 = 4) 0.6816 1.6805 0.0354 0.0351 0.4708 1.1550 0.0243 0.0239 0.2985 0.7369 0.0145 0.0144
FGSM (𝜖 = 8) 0.6880 1.6876 0.0355 0.0351 0.4730 1.1593 0.0242 0.0239 0.2985 0.7319 0.0143 0.0142
PGD (𝜖 = 4) 0.6900 1.6920 0.0356 0.0352 0.4737 1.1503 0.0244 0.0238 0.3057 0.7451 0.0155 0.0152
PGD (𝜖 = 8) 0.6727 1.6561 0.0348 0.0344 0.4919 1.1811 0.0254 0.0246 0.2988 0.7374 0.0151 0.0150
C & W 0.6746 1.6461 0.0329 0.0329 0.4655 1.1409 0.0240 0.0237 0.2844 0.7062 0.0144 0.0144
VBPR
Original 0.4377 1.2812 0.0199 0.0237 0.5108 1.2390 0.0251 0.0251 0.3417 0.9570 0.0161 0.0184
FGSM (𝜖 = 4) 0.3860 1.0793 0.0174 0.0198 0.6032 1.3813 0.0310 0.0292 0.6088 1.1151 0.0303 0.0246
FGSM (𝜖 = 8) 0.4057 1.2445 0.0179 0.0228 0.6186 1.4160 0.0319 0.0301 0.6313 1.1662 0.0332 0.0263
PGD (𝜖 = 4) 0.9142 2.3673 0.0459 0.0483 0.6309 1.4456 0.0315 0.0296 0.6263 1.1165 0.0330 0.0257
PGD (𝜖 = 8) 1.4462 3.4759 0.0748 0.0741 0.6413 1.4674 0.0336 0.0314 0.6139 1.1194 0.0322 0.0254
C & W 0.4147 1.2121 0.0173 0.0214 0.6280 1.4277 0.0326 0.0303 0.5729 1.1019 0.0302 0.0247
AMR
Original 0.9449 2.0206 0.0462 0.0422 0.8342 1.4602 0.0433 0.0332 0.5063 0.7841 0.0303 0.0207
FGSM (𝜖 = 4) 1.3173 2.4648 0.0862 0.0649 0.7135 1.7675 0.0334 0.0351 0.4565 1.0392 0.0230 0.0217
FGSM (𝜖 = 8) 1.2814 2.2121 0.0876 0.0620 0.7137 1.7595 0.0341 0.0356 0.4429 1.0408 0.0221 0.0213
PGD (𝜖 = 4) 1.1958 2.0161 0.0713 0.0517 0.6473 1.7284 0.0307 0.0342 0.4900 1.0750 0.0240 0.0219
PGD (𝜖 = 8) 1.2377 2.6192 0.0679 0.0593 0.6770 1.7451 0.0322 0.0346 0.4445 1.0364 0.0221 0.0213
C & W 1.3012 2.2742 0.0746 0.0558 0.7159 1.7976 0.0336 0.0357 0.4977 1.0714 0.0243 0.0219
Tradesy
FM
Original 0.3371 0.8935 0.0145 0.0217 0.3579 0.8852 0.0160 0.0219 0.4649 1.1398 0.0212 0.0246
FGSM (𝜖 = 4) 0.3617 0.9098 0.0161 0.0228 0.3744 0.9151 0.0168 0.0227 0.5118 1.2292 0.0236 0.0261
FGSM (𝜖 = 8) 0.3696 0.9232 0.0164 0.0229 0.3822 0.9141 0.0166 0.0218 0.5119 1.2271 0.0233 0.0257
PGD (𝜖 = 4) 0.3603 0.9095 0.0158 0.0226 0.3598 0.9024 0.0158 0.0216 0.5081 1.2300 0.0236 0.0256
PGD (𝜖 = 8) 0.4028 0.9811 0.0181 0.0250 0.3741 0.9018 0.0165 0.0221 0.5092 1.2295 0.0234 0.0259
C & W 0.3750 0.9242 0.0167 0.0234 0.3913 0.9356 0.0179 0.0233 0.5116 1.2260 0.0240 0.0269
VBPR
Original 0.4108 1.0721 0.0186 0.0271 0.2973 0.7526 0.0122 0.0173 0.3179 0.9602 0.0129 0.0180
FGSM (𝜖 = 4) 0.5202 1.2273 0.0260 0.0333 0.5055 0.9778 0.0242 0.0267 0.5644 1.1905 0.0261 0.0267
FGSM (𝜖 = 8) 0.7251 1.4667 0.0408 0.0458 0.4807 0.9567 0.0224 0.0252 0.4868 1.0908 0.0210 0.0230
PGD (𝜖 = 4) 1.2552 2.2920 0.0649 0.0699 0.4431 0.8885 0.0199 0.0226 0.5217 1.1586 0.0235 0.0243
PGD (𝜖 = 8) 1.6982 2.9039 0.0913 0.0971 0.4726 0.9346 0.0211 0.0243 0.5317 1.1580 0.0232 0.0245
C & W 0.4523 1.0561 0.0221 0.0286 0.4766 0.9920 0.0223 0.0257 0.5474 1.2309 0.0242 0.0252
AMR
Original 0.3653 1.0573 0.0154 0.0252 0.1626 0.5346 0.0059 0.0115 0.2189 0.7609 0.0079 0.0135
FGSM (𝜖 = 4) 0.4759 1.2386 0.0215 0.0325 0.3587 0.8059 0.0162 0.0202 0.4041 0.9674 0.0180 0.0202
FGSM (𝜖 = 8) 0.5896 1.3448 0.0302 0.0376 0.3512 0.7887 0.0165 0.0200 0.3745 0.9132 0.0159 0.0184
PGD (𝜖 = 4) 1.0393 1.9715 0.0523 0.0593 0.3438 0.7686 0.0160 0.0193 0.3635 0.8986 0.0160 0.0184
PGD (𝜖 = 8) 1.6016 2.6768 0.0781 0.0852 0.3494 0.7726 0.0160 0.0197 0.3864 0.9416 0.0171 0.0193
C & W 0.4302 1.1161 0.0189 0.0278 0.3577 0.8218 0.0175 0.0217 0.3621 0.9178 0.0147 0.0177
Analysis of Category-based Performance. After having jus-
tified the results in Table 4, we discuss the category-based measures
across models and datasets. Studying the𝐶𝐻𝑅@𝐾 and 𝑛𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@𝐾
from recommenders point of view, FM appears as the least affected
model. For instance <Amazon Men, (Adversarial Training, Free Ad-
versarial Training), FM> and <Amazon Women, Free Adversarial
Training, FM> register reductions even in terms of category mea-
sures after all the attacks. In general, the average𝐶𝐻𝑅@20 variation
between each FM attack-free setting and the most effective attack
is only 8.66%, i.e., a rather small value compared to other models
(127.02% for VBPR experiments).We explain the highly negligible
impact of attacks against FM by recalling that the implemented ver-
sion [23] is not designed to integrate continuous visual features with
a large dimensionality (i.e., 2048) unlike VBPR and AMR.
As regards VBPR, the PGD strategy reaches the larger variation
of𝐶𝐻𝑅@𝐾 and 𝑛𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@𝐾 in the defense-free setting, confirming
the previous considerations made about these metrics with the
feature loss. For instance, PGD (𝜖 = 8) leads to a 4 times increase of
the𝐶𝐻𝑅@20 of the attacked category (i.e., suit), and about a 5 times
increase of the 𝑛𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@20 on the Tradesy dataset. Additionally,
C & W is the attack with the best average variation on all the rank-
based metrics in the defense scenario. For instance, C & W attacks
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make 𝐶𝐻𝑅@20 and 𝑛𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@20 grow by an average of 69.48%,
and 91.01%, respectively. These results suggest that the adversarial
robustification strategies have not protected VBPR from the injection
of perturbed product images despite they got high performance in
protecting the classification task.
The third tested VRS is AMR. We chose this model since it is
the first VRS to integrate adversarial protection by design, so we
expected to get a limited variation in traditional performance under
attack settings. Surprisingly, results show that AMR is prone to
the effects of attacks as much as VBPR. For example, PGD (𝜖 = 8)
method represents the biggest security threat on the VRS in defense-
free settings, while C & W is the best attack when the IFE is de-
fended. Moreover, <Free Adversarial Training, AMR> and <Adver-
sarial Training, AMR> do not provide any protection improvements,
notwithstanding the two defense techniques applied on both the
IFE and the VRS respectively. For instance, the mild 𝐶𝐻𝑅@20 im-
provement seen in <C & W, Free Adversarial Training, AMR> is
higher than the one obtained in <C &W, Free Adversarial Training,
VBPR> (i.e., 77.64% and 69.48% respectively), but the latter did not
involve any defense method on the VRS. We conclude that the com-
bination of the state-of-the-art defense techniques against adversarial
perturbations applied on both DNNs and VRSs does not preserve the
quality of the recommendation.
Conclusively, we compare 𝐶𝐻𝑅@𝐾 and 𝑛𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@𝐾 . The calcu-
lated values for 𝑛𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@𝐾 confirm the trends noticed in𝐶𝐻𝑅@𝐾 .
Furthermore, we observe 𝑛𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@𝐾 shows a relatively higher im-
provement than the one captured by the 𝐶𝐻𝑅@𝐾 in any <dataset,
attack, defense, recommender> setting. Here, we draw two final
considerations: (i) 𝑛𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@𝐾 and 𝐶𝐻𝑅@𝐾 are two metrics suit-
able to evaluate the motivating scenario (i.e., an adversary who wants
to push a category of products), and (ii) even though attacks have
pushed the products into the top-𝐾 lists (see 𝐶𝐻𝑅@𝐾 results), an
argument could be made that these products get very high positions
since 𝑛𝐶𝐷𝐶𝐺@𝐾 have increased even more that 𝐶𝐻𝑅@𝐾 .
Evaluation of the effects of adversarial defenses on the IFE
in the variation of overall recommendation measures. Table 5
shows the accuracy and beyond accuracy results on the Amazon
Men dataset for the two most powerful attacks previously discussed.
The intuition behind this evaluation is to understand whether the
application of adversarial defenses —adopted to alleviate attacks’
influence— may generate a drastic variation of the overall recom-
mendation performance. In Table 5, we bolded the best results
for each <defense, VRS> experiment. Surprisingly, we see that the
application of powerful attacks has not tragically worsened the ac-
curacy and beyond accuracy performance. On the contrary, some
measures have significantly improved as a consequence of the attack.
For instance, AMR has its best performance under all combinations
attacks combinations independently from the application of a de-
fense mechanism. On the other side, it is worth noticing the item
coverage generally gets better under attack settings. We explain this
effect by the fact that, since adversarial images can be considered
a source of randomness, they might help the recommendation of
products from the long tail (e.g., products similar to the attacked
ones may get benefit from the attack process).
Furthermore, Table 5 shows that VBPR and FM have their best
accuracy performance in defense-activated settings. For instance,
<Amazon Men, Original, Defense-free, VBPR> has Recall and nDCG
Table 5: Overall recommendation performance evaluated on
the top-20 recommendation lists.
Dataset VRS AdversarialAttack
Image Feature Extractor
𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑛𝐷𝐶𝐺 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖 𝐸𝐹𝐷 𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑣
Traditional
Amazon
Men
FM
Original 0.0027 0.0010 0.6025 0.0018 7367
PGD (𝜖 = 8) 0.0024 0.0009 0.5995 0.0016 7369
C & W 0.0023 0.0009 0.6026 0.0016 7370
VBPR
Original 0.0127 0.0046 0.0519 0.0073 1954
PGD (𝜖 = 8) 0.0126 0.0044 0.0531 0.0070 1951
C & W 0.0132 0.0045 0.0519 0.0072 1925
AMR
Original 0.0330 0.0123 0.0272 0.0171 1586
PGD (𝜖 = 8) 0.0316 0.0119 0.0314 0.0166 1716
C & W 0.0333 0.0125 0.0256 0.0174 1488
Adversarial Training
FM
Original 0.0034 0.0012 0.6406 0.0021 7370
PGD (𝜖 = 8) 0.0023 0.0009 0.5940 0.0016 7368
C & W 0.0023 0.0009 0.5828 0.0016 7368
VBPR
Original 0.0193 0.0076 0.0494 0.0112 1826
PGD (𝜖 = 8) 0.0129 0.0045 0.0550 0.0072 1990
C & W 0.0124 0.0045 0.0543 0.0071 1956
AMR
Original 0.0312 0.0118 0.0039 0.0151 224
PGD (𝜖 = 8) 0.0332 0.0125 0.0279 0.0174 1496
C & W 0.0327 0.0124 0.0277 0.0172 1429
Free Adversarial Training
FM
Original 0.0024 0.0009 0.6329 0.0017 7371
PGD (𝜖 = 8) 0.0025 0.0010 0.6016 0.0018 7369
C & W 0.0021 0.0008 0.5991 0.0015 7366
VBPR
Original 0.0236 0.0089 0.0325 0.0125 1184
PGD (𝜖 = 8) 0.0129 0.0046 0.0528 0.0073 1900
C & W 0.0123 0.0044 0.0555 0.0070 1992
AMR
Original 0.0317 0.0118 0.0067 0.0154 402
PGD (𝜖 = 8) 0.0331 0.0123 0.0271 0.0171 1420
C & W 0.0325 0.0123 0.0265 0.0171 1425
equal to 0.0127 and 0.0046, while in the defense-activated settings
both metrics are quite doubled, i.e., 0.0193 and 0.0076 in Adversarial
Training and 0.0236 and 0.0089 in Free Adversarial Training. The
confirmation of this trend in attack scenarios raises the following
conclusion: the application of defense mechanisms on the IFE is a
system design possibility that preserves, or even improves, the overall
performance of a VRS, while does not guarantee the protection from
altering the recommendability of the category of products.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
We have presented an evaluation framework, i.e., Visual Adversarial
Recommendation (VAR), to explore the efficacy of adversarial robus-
tification mechanisms against several state-of-the-art adversarial
attacks and to investigate the impact of perturbed product images
on visually-aware recommendations. Experimental results have
shown that defense mechanisms do not guarantee the protections
of recommenders against attacks also in the case of low-success
rate attacks. Interestingly, we have found that the effectiveness
of attacks in altering the recommenders is more related to high
feature losses than high success rates. This finding raises inter-
esting opportunities to develop novel recommender models along
with defense strategies. Finally, we have verified that overall recom-
mendation performance has not worsened under the experimented
threat model, and (surprisingly) defended IFEs may even improve in
non-attack settings. This further opens future directions in finding
the reasons behind this behavior, getting the most benefits from it.
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